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INTRODUCTION 
The mortgage interest deduction (MID) is one of the oldest and largest tax expenditures in the 
federal income tax and is the largest single federal subsidy for owner-occupied housing. The 
president’s fiscal year 2010 budget reports that, in 2012, the MID will cost the federal Treasury an 
estimated $131 billion, much more than the total of all outlays by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development ($48 billion). Homeowners also benefit from other federal tax preferences, 
including deductibility of residential property taxes on owner-occupied homes ($31 billion), and 
exclusion of tax on the first $250,000 ($500,000 for joint returns) of capital gains on housing ($50 
billion). 
The MID was not originally placed in income tax law to subsidize home ownership. When the modern 
federal income tax was enacted in 1913 shortly after ratification of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, all interest payments were made deductible on the grounds that interest payments 
were an expense of earning business and investment income. Congress made no distinction, 
however, between interest incurred for the production of taxable income (such as interest on 
business loans) and interest incurred to generate non-taxable “imputed” returns from homes and 
consumer durables.1 The deduction had little effect on housing investment before World War II 
because only the very highest-income individuals paid any income tax. 
The conversion of the income tax from a “class” to a “mass” tax during World War II, followed by a 
large postwar growth in home ownership rates fueled by the increased availability of long-term 
mortgage finance, converted the mortgage interest deduction from a provision used by only a few 
taxpayers into a major subsidy for middle- and upper-middle-income homeowners. By the time the 
Treasury and congressional agencies began publishing annual lists of tax expenditures in the 1970s, 
the mortgage interest deduction had become one of the largest single preferences in the tax law. 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA 86) eliminated many tax preferences in the federal income tax to 
finance lower marginal tax rates and higher personal exemptions, but left the deductibility of 
mortgage interest largely intact.2 TRA 86 eliminated the deductibility of all consumer interest, 
including credit card debt and loans to finance cars, furniture, and other consumer durable items. 
But TRA retained the deductibility of mortgage interest on loans up to $1 million. In addition to the 
deduction on new (and re-financed) mortgage loans, taxpayers may deduct up to $100,000 of 
                                                     
1 Subsequently, however, Congress did eliminate the deductibility of interest on debt used to finance the purchase of tax-
exempt municipal securities, with an exception for commercial banks.  The exception for commercial banks was repealed in 
1986. 
2 The original Treasury Department tax reform proposal was developed in 1984 in response to a request by President 
Reagan in January 1984 to develop a plan to “simplify the tax code so that all taxpayers big and small are treated fairly and 
make the tax base broader so that personal tax rates could come down, not go up.”  The president asked the Treasury to 
present their recommendations after the 1984 election.  The president allowed the Treasury wide discretion to eliminate 
tax preferences, with the exception of a specific commitment in a May 1984 speech that the administration would retain 
the home mortgage interest deduction. 
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interest on home equity loans (i.e., additional housing debt incurred subsequent to the initial home 
purchase).3  
Although the mortgage interest deduction rivals Social Security benefits as a “third rail” provision 
that elected officials would tamper with at their peril, many analysts have nonetheless raised 
concerns about it. The Congressional Budget Office usually includes proposals to eliminate or scale 
back the MID in its list of budget reduction options.4 The MID disproportionately benefits taxpayers in 
the top fifth of the income distribution (Toder, Harris, and Lim 2009). Those who do not itemize 
deductions on their tax returns receive no benefit and the subsidy rate is larger for individuals in 
higher marginal tax rate brackets. Because most who benefit would own homes without the 
deduction, it mostly provides an incentive to live in more expensive homes, not to own instead of 
rent. Other countries without an MID have similar homeownership rates. If the government wishes to 
promote homeownership, a refundable tax credit available to all taxpayers, not just itemizers or 
those with positive tax liability, would be more effective. Given the large and growing projected 
federal budget deficits, it is worth reexamining the effectiveness of all federal spending programs, 
including those embodied in the federal income tax. 
The next section briefly reviews issues and findings from previous research. We then present new 
estimates of the deduction’s distributional benefits by income group, family type, and race/ethnicity 
as well as the distributional effects of proposals to eliminate, scale back, or replace the MID with 
more broad-based tax incentives. 
Issues and Findings of Previous Literature 
The main argument for subsidizing homeownership is that ownership may provide positive spillover 
effects to individuals other than the owner. For example, it is possible that homeowners take better 
care of their property, are more engaged in local politics and community building, and are more 
willing to invest in the community than renters because the higher home values that community 
amenities produce benefit them directly.5 Previous research has found evidence that homeowners 
are more likely to perform maintenance and have higher rates of civic participation than renters and 
that crime rates are lower in areas with more homeowners (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Galster 
1983; Glaeser and Sacerdote 2000; Glaeser and Shapiro 2003; Rossi and Weber 1996). The 
direction of causality between homeownership and these spillover benefits, however, is difficult to 
demonstrate. People who are more likely to participate in community activities may also be more 
                                                     
3 In practice, individuals often use the proceeds of home equity loans to purchase cars and other durables, thereby making 
the costs of financing these items effectively deductible to homeowners. 
4 See, for example, Congressional Budget Office, “Budget Options,” vol. 2 (Washington, DC: CBO, 2009), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10294/08-06-BudgetOptions.pdf. 
5 The incentive for homeowners to keep property values high can also be a negative externality; for example, it could 
contribute to resistance to racial integration of neighborhoods. 
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likely to own homes, so that homeownership itself does not necessarily cause higher community 
engagement. 
There are other reasons for encouraging homeownership by low-income households. 
Homeownership is a means of asset accumulation and may be an important component of a 
strategy to promote social mobility through asset building. Homeownership subsidies may also 
counterbalance rental subsidies that would bias tenure choice for low-income individuals toward 
renting instead of owning. On the other side, however, recent events in the subprime mortgage 
market remind us that policies to promote homeownership can hurt low-income households if they 
encourage them to take on mortgage commitments they cannot afford. 
Even assuming homeownership subsidies are desirable, researchers find that the current MID is not 
a cost-effective tool for increasing homeownership because its main beneficiaries are not individuals 
on the margin between renting and owning. The deduction is only available to itemizing taxpayers 
and its value rises with an individual’s tax rate. The result is that most benefits from the deduction 
are concentrated at the high end of the income distribution, where homeownership rates are likely to 
be high with or without the deduction. High-income taxpayers are much more likely to itemize than 
low-income individuals. Poterba and Sinai (2008) find that 85.5 percent of tax units with annual 
incomes between $75,000 and $125,000 and over 98 percent of tax units with incomes above 
$125,000 itemize, while only 23.4 percent of those making less than $40,000 itemize. The average 
value of the MID rises steadily with income from $91 for those with annual incomes less than 
$40,000 to $5,459 for those making more than $250,000. 
Empirical research has found little evidence that the MID increases homeownership. Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2003) note that the value of the deduction has risen and fallen by tenfold in the past 50 
years while homeownership rates have remained nearly unchanged between 63 and 68 percent. 
Their formal analysis of time-series data finds no effect of the MID on homeownership rates. Cross-
national comparisons in Gale, Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz (2007) also conclude that the 
mortgage interest deduction is not correlated with higher homeownership rates. Gale (1997) finds 
that, similar to the U.S. experience, changes in the value of the MID in the United Kingdom are not 
associated with changes in the homeownership rate. Mann (2000) compares homeownership rates 
and mortgage interest tax treatment across ten countries and also finds no consistent relationship 
between homeownership and the interest deduction. 
The MID also has the potential to affect homeownership through its impact on home prices. The 
subsidy makes individuals willing to pay a higher price for the same home, but the resulting effect on 
home prices depends on the elasticity of the housing supply. The effect of the deduction on house 
prices is likely to vary across and within regions due to differences in tax rates and the availability of 
undeveloped land. The deduction will raise prices more in densely populated areas with low housing-
supply elasticities and high tax rates. At the extreme, Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996) 
estimate an upper-bound estimate of the effect on prices at 10 percent, assuming that the housing 
stock is totally inelastic. 
 Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction  4 
The indirect effect of the MID on homeownership through higher home prices could fully offset any 
direct effect from the increased demand to own homes. For example, Bourassa and Yin (2007), in an 
analysis of urban adults between 25 and 34 years old, estimate that eliminating the mortgage 
interest deduction would increase, instead of decrease, their homeownership rate from 41.5 to 42.5 
percent.6 This occurs because the positive effect on ownership by young adults through lower home 
prices more than offsets the negative effect from the loss of the deduction. This study also illustrates 
the regional variation in the effect of the deduction. Cities with relatively high-priced, space-
constrained markets, such as San Francisco, experience larger increases in homeownership rates 
when the deduction is eliminated than cities like Birmingham and Tampa, where the price effect is 
minimal. The overall estimated change in the homeownership rate from eliminating the MID, 
however, is fairly small. 
Gyourko and Sinai (2001) also examine the regional distribution of the mortgage interest deduction. 
They find that the benefits from the deduction are unevenly concentrated between states and cities 
as well as within cities. Assuming the deduction were financed by a lump-sum, per-household tax, 
they find that the MID provides net positive benefits to only 20 percent of states and 10 percent of 
metropolitan areas. Three large metropolitan areas receive over 75 percent of the net positive 
benefits: New York City–Northern New Jersey, Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County, and San 
Francisco–Oakland–San Jose. Within metropolitan areas that receive net benefits, the benefits 
disproportionately accrue to wealthy households. The authors argue that the mortgage interest 
deduction is more regressive than the tax system is progressive, in part because in addition to 
receiving a larger tax benefit per dollar of deduction, wealthy individuals also own more expensive 
homes. 
Some researchers have argued that replacing the MID with a credit would boost homeownership 
rates by making the incentive to purchase a home more equal across the income distribution. This 
could encourage individuals with low marginal tax rates who currently do not itemize to become 
homeowners because they can benefit from a mortgage interest credit. Green and Vandell (1999) 
estimate that replacing both the MID and the property tax deduction with a revenue-neutral credit of 
$1,173 for all homeowners would raise the overall homeownership rate by 3 percent. Although the 
total subsidy to housing would remain the same, the shift to a credit would have important 
distributional implications. The policy would increase homeownership for individuals with household 
incomes of less than $40,000 per year by enough to more than offset a decrease in the 
homeownership rate by those making more than $40,000. More minorities would become 
homeowners, while the homeownership rate for whites would decrease. Reschovsky and Green 
(1998) find similar results, estimating a 3 percent rise in the homeownership rate from replacing the 
MID with a refundable credit equal to 21 percent of interest. Gale, Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz 
(2007) propose replacing the MID with a refundable first-time homebuyers credit equal to $6,000 for 
                                                     
6 Higher prices caused by the MID could possibly delay homeownership for 25- to 34-year-olds, permanently keeping them 
renters. 
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married couples and $3,000 for others. They argue that the credit would increase homeownership, 
cost less than the current MID, and be more progressive. Carasso, Steuerle, and Bell (2005) 
estimate that nearly 50 percent of tax units would see a tax cut if the MID were replaced with a 
revenue neutral, fully refundable credit equal to 1.03 percent of home value up to $100,000. This 
credit would also increase progressivity; on average, individuals in the bottom four quintiles would 
see an increase in after-tax income, while those in the top quintile would see a decrease. 
In conclusion, many studies have demonstrated a correlation between increased social 
connectedness and higher homeownership rates, although whether homeownership itself produces 
these benefits is unclear. But even if community benefits justify a subsidy for homeownership, 
evidence suggests the MID is not the way to deliver it. Previous research suggests that the MID has 
little impact on homeownership rates because its primary beneficiaries are not those on the border 
between renting and owning. Studies suggest that replacing the deduction with a credit could 
increase overall homeownership rates by shifting the subsidy from high-income taxpayers to lower-
income ones who have lower current rates of homeownership and are more likely to become 
homeowners in response to a subsidy. Some evidence even suggests that replacing the MID with a 
credit that is more broadly available could increase homeownership at a lower budgetary cost to the 
federal government. 
Effects of Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Income Group and Family Type 
The mortgage interest deduction mainly benefits homeowners in the top fifth of the income 
distribution because it is only available to those who itemize deductions on their tax returns and is 
worth more to itemizing taxpayers in higher tax brackets. We estimate the distributional effects of 
several proposals to reform the mortgage interest deduction by income group and family type. These 
proposals include completely eliminating the mortgage interest deduction, replacing the deduction 
with more progressive mortgage interest subsidies, and limiting the deduction for those in the 
highest tax brackets. 
We display two groups of estimates. The static estimates assume no behavioral responses. For an 
alternative set of estimates, we assume some taxpayers pay down their mortgage in response to the 
elimination of the deduction or substitution of smaller interest rate subsidies. For both groups of 
estimates, we assume no changes in housing consumption or housing tenure choice. In other words, 
we are not estimating how policy changes would affect homeownership rates, but rather how they 
would affect tax liability and after-tax income, assuming no changes in real economic behavior. 
Policies Estimated 
We estimate the effects of eliminating the mortgage interest deduction, replacing it with alternative 
forms of tax credits for interest paid, and limiting the value of the deduction to 28 percent.  All 
estimates are for 2012. 
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Eliminate the mortgage interest deduction. Under this option, the mortgage interest deduction would 
be eliminated, without being replaced by an alternative subsidy for mortgage interest. The increased 
revenue from eliminating the deduction could be used to pay for lower tax rates across the board, 
refundable credits or grants to taxpayers, increased federal spending, or debt reduction. 
Replace the mortgage interest deduction with revenue-neutral mortgage interest subsidies. Under 
these four options, the mortgage interest deduction would be replaced with alternative tax subsidies 
for interest payments that keep total federal tax receipts unchanged. The two alternative subsidy 
designs are a tax credit for a fixed percentage of all interest paid and a tax credit for 100 percent of 
a fixed dollar amount of interest paid. For both the percentage credit and the capped 100 percent 
credit, we estimate the effects of making the credit either non-refundable (available only up to the 
amount of positive federal income tax liability) or refundable. All four credit options are available to 
both itemizers and non-itemizers. 
Limit the mortgage interest deduction for high-income taxpayers to the 28 percent bracket. Under 
this option, the tax saving from deducting mortgage interest for taxpayers in the 33 and 35 percent 
brackets would be limited to 28 percent of home mortgage interest paid. The president’s 2010 
budget included a similar proposal for all itemized deductions as an option to finance health care 
reform, but Congress did not enact it.  This proposal was also included in the president’s 2011 
budget. 
Assumption for Estimates 
Data and methodology. The estimates use tax return data from the Urban–Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model (TPC model). The TPC model calculates tax liability for a 
representative sample of households under current law and alternative tax rules. The sample 
includes over 130,000 individual income tax returns filed in 2004 from the public use file produced 
by the Statistics of Income Division (SOI) of the Internal Revenue Service. The data source is similar 
to data used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the 
Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis for their revenue and distributional estimates of tax policy 
proposals, except for some changes in the sample and the elimination of certain data fields to mask 
the identity of individual taxpayers. 
TPC augments the tax return sample with data on non-filers, based on a statistical match between 
the SOI and the Current Population Survey. The TPC model includes a detailed tax calculator 
incorporating parameters of current, past, and future tax laws, which can compute individual income 
taxes paid by all tax units. Documentation of the model is supplied in Rohaly, Carasso, and Saleem 
(2005). 
The data in the TPC model are projected to tax years 2009–2019, based on CBO economic forecasts 
and on the most recently published data on the distribution of individual income and income sources 
by income group from the SOI. TPC has also statistically matched to the tax returns data on wealth 
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holdings by income group from the Survey of Consumer Finances and imputed itemized deductions 
(including mortgage interest paid) to non-itemizers. 
Baseline assumptions. We estimate the distributional effects of all proposals assuming otherwise 
that the income tax law in effect today remains unchanged, with two exceptions. First, we assume 
that the Bush administration tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 and extended in 2006 are made 
permanent. Second, we assume that the 2009 parameters of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) are 
made permanent and indexed to changes in the consumer price index. These two modifications of 
current law mean that automatic tax increases scheduled to take effect in 2010 (from reductions in 
AMT exemptions) and 2011 (from expiration of the Bush tax cuts) will not occur. These assumptions 
are almost the same as those used in the Administration’s baseline.7 We display revenue effects 
relative to both a current law baseline and this “current policy” baseline.8
Differences between static estimates and estimates with behavioral response. Both the static and 
behavioral response estimates assume no change in real economic behavior in response to the tax 
proposals. Taxpayers do not change their total consumption of housing or housing tenure (own or 
rent) status. They also do not change their work effort, saving, or other real economic decisions in 
response to changes in their marginal tax rates that eliminating the MID might produce. 
For the behavioral response estimates, however, we do assume that taxpayers may change their 
financial portfolios in response to eliminating the MID. If the MID were eliminated, taxpayers holding 
financial assets that generate positive taxable income could reduce their tax liability by selling these 
tax-generating assets and using the proceeds to pay off mortgage debt. Their net wealth would 
remain unchanged, but their taxes would go down because they would not be issuing non-deductible 
debt to hold taxable assets. Following Gale, Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz (2007), we assume 
that taxpayers will first reduce their taxable interest income and then their taxable dividends and 
capital gains to offset any non-deductible interest. 
This financial response enables households with other taxable assets to finance housing investment 
at the after-tax cost of funds even without the MID. Effectively, their opportunity cost of holding more 
housing wealth is that they can hold less wealth in other assets. In contrast, households without 
                                                     
7 The administration also includes in its baseline a few of the temporary stimulus provisions enacted in 2009. 
8 The baseline used in our estimates of the budgetary effects of the administration’s policies assumes the Bush tax cuts 
and the AMT “patch” are extended.  In contrast, the baseline used to estimate tax expenditures in the Analytical 
Perspectives Section of the fiscal year 2011 budget assumes the Bush tax cuts expire as scheduled at the end of 2010 
and the AMT patch expires at the end of 2009. Because marginal tax rates are higher under this “current law” baseline 
than under the “current policy baseline,” the mortgage interest deduction costs more under current law than in the current 
policy baseline. Our estimates also differ from those reported in the fiscal year 2011 budget because they use 2009 CBO 
economic assumptions instead of the administration’s February 2010 economic projections. 
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other financial wealth (mostly younger households) will see their net cost of housing finance increase 
when the MID is eliminated.9  
Revenue Estimates 
Eliminating the mortgage interest deduction would increase calendar year tax liability by $108 billion 
in 2012, relative to current law, and by about $1.26 trillion over 10 years (table 1). Compared with 
the current policy baseline, which assumes the Bush tax cuts are extended and the 2009 AMT 
exemptions, rate bracket threshold, and phase-out exemption thresholds are extended and indexed 
for inflation, eliminating the mortgage deduction would raise $88 billion. 
The revenue gains are less if we assume that individuals holding taxable assets sell some of these 
assets to reduce their mortgage debt if the deduction is eliminated. The 2012 increase in tax liability 
then declines to $91 billion compared with the current law baseline and $75 billion compared with 
the current policy baseline. 
Limiting the mortgage interest deduction to 28 percent of interest paid for individuals in the 33 and 
35 percent rate brackets would raise only a fraction of the amount raised by eliminating the 
deduction. Absent behavioral changes, the proposal would increase tax liability by about $3 billion in 
2012 and $40 billion over 10 years relative to the current baseline. If taxpayers pay off their 
mortgages to reduce tax liability, the proposal would instead raise slightly under $3 billion in 2012 
and $38 billion over 10 years. 
Distributional Estimates by Income Group 
Eliminating or scaling back the mortgage interest deduction. Eliminating the mortgage interest 
deduction would raise taxes by an average of $559 over all tax units, including those not using the 
deduction, and reduce after-tax income on average by slightly less than 1 percent (table 2a). Slightly 
less than a quarter of all tax units would see their taxes increase. The effects would vary greatly 
across income groups. Less than 1 percent of tax units in the bottom quintile and slightly over a fifth 
in the middle-income quintile would pay more tax, compared with almost 70 percent in the top 
quintile. Within the top quintile, the largest share paying higher taxes would be those between the 
90th and 95th percentiles of the income distribution. Eliminating the deduction affects a slightly 
smaller share of tax units at very top of the distribution (60 percent) because many have paid off 
their mortgages. 
                                                     
9 The scenarios where the MID is replaced by a fixed percentage interest subsidy are more complicated. In these scenarios, 
households are assumed to reduce their holdings of taxable financial wealth only to the extent the marginal tax rate they 
face on income from those assets is higher than the percentage subsidy rate. For example, if a taxpayer is in the 33 
percent bracket, and the MID is replaced with a 20 percent interest credit, she will still reduce her interest income (taxed at 
33 percent) and interest deductions (deducted at 20 percent), but no longer reduce her capital gains and dividends (taxed 
at 15 percent). 
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The percentage reduction in after-tax income from eliminating the deduction would be largest for 
taxpayers in the 80th to 99th percentiles of the distribution. These upper-middle-income households 
would be affected more than tax units in the bottom four quintiles because they are more likely to 
own homes and itemize deductions and because the higher marginal tax rates they face make 
deductions worth more to them than to lower-income taxpayers. The very highest income taxpayers, 
however, will experience a relatively small drop in income (about 0.4 percent on average) because, 
at the very highest income levels, mortgage interest payments decline sharply as a share of income. 
Limiting the mortgage interest deduction to 28 percent of interest paid in the 33 and 35 percent rate 
brackets would affect only the very highest income taxpayers. Taxes paid would increase for about 
40 percent of tax units in the 95th to 99th percentiles of the income distribution and about 55 
percent in the top 1 percent. The absolute tax increase would be largest for those in the top 1 
percent, but the percentage reduction in after-tax income would be largest for those in the 95th to 
99th percentiles. 
Revenue-neutral substitution of mortgage interest credits for the mortgage interest deduction. We 
simulated four options for replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a mortgage interest credit 
(table 3a). In all four options, both itemizers and non-itemizers are allowed to claim the credit, in 
contrast to the current deduction, which is only available to tax filers who itemize deductions. All four 
options provided the same total subsidy to homeownership as the current mortgage interest 
deduction. 
• A non-refundable credit equal to 20 percent of mortgage interest paid would cost the same as 
the current mortgage interest deduction. Replacing the deduction with a non-refundable credit 
would raise after-tax incomes in the bottom 80 percent of the distribution, with taxpayers in the 
middle income quintile receiving the largest average gain as a share of after-tax income. The 
lowest income taxpayers, however, although they lose very little from elimination of the mortgage 
interest deduction, also would receive little net benefit from substituting a non-refundable credit. 
Taxpayers in the top quintile would see their after-tax incomes drop because the tax saving per 
dollar of interest paid at 20 cents on the dollar is much less than the tax saving from a deduction 
in their tax bracket. 
• A non-refundable credit equal to 100 percent of the first $2,030 of interest paid (and nothing for 
interest greater than the threshold) would be more redistributive to middle-income families than 
the fixed percentage interest credit.10 Middle-income people would benefit more because they on 
average pay less than $10,150 per year in mortgage interest, so they gain more from a $2,030 
                                                     
10 We assume that rules would be in place to prevent individuals who have paid off their mortgages to refinance in order to 
receive the 100 percent credit. As a practical matter, however, this proposal may create some enforcement problems and 
provide an incentive for some new home buyers to borrow more than they otherwise would to take advantage of the credit. 
 Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction  10 
credit than from a credit of 20 percent of interest paid.11 Correspondingly, high-income people 
would lose more under the 100 percent capped credit than under the 20 percent matching 
credit because they on average claim larger amounts of interest deductions. 
• A refundable credit equal to 17.1 percent of mortgage interest paid would cost the same as a 
non-refundable 20 percent credit. Compared with a non-refundable credit, it would raise after-tax 
incomes more for tax units in the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution, raise incomes 
less for tax units in the fourth quintile, and lower after-tax incomes more for taxpayers in the top 
quintile. Taxpayers in the bottom three quintiles would benefit from being able to claim more of 
the subsidy if it is refundable, with the gain from switching to a refundable credit largest in the 
bottom quintile. Higher income taxpayers would be worse off because they can already fully use 
a non-refundable credit, so are better off with the higher credit rate the non-refundable subsidy 
provides. 
• A 100 percent refundable credit up to a maximum of $1,490 would, among all these incentives, 
provide the largest gains to taxpayers in the bottom quintile of the income distribution and 
impose the largest losses on those in the top quintile of the distribution. Taxpayers in the fourth 
quintile would on average still experience a gain in after-tax income, but the gain would be 
slightly less than under the refundable percentage credit. 
Comparing the four options for replacing the mortgage interest deduction with an interest credit, tax 
units in the bottom four quintiles benefit under all four options (table 4a). Taxpayers in the bottom 
three quintiles benefit the most under the 100 percent capped refundable credit, while those in the 
fourth quintile gain the most under the 100 percent capped non-refundable credit. Taxpayers in the 
top fifth of the income distribution lose under all four options. They incur the largest losses under the 
capped 100 percent refundable credit and the smallest losses under the 20 percent non-refundable 
matching credit. 
Distributional Estimates by Family Type and Age 
Among family types, elimination of the mortgage interest deduction has the biggest income impact 
on married taxpayers with children (table 5a). It would raise their taxes on average by $1,464 per tax 
unit (1.4 percent of after-tax income), compared with $667 for married couples with no children (0.7 
percent of after-tax income), $250 for singles with children (0.7 percent of after-tax income), and 
$241 for singles with no children (0.7 percent of after-tax income). Non-elderly tax units (tax units 
with both head of household and spouse under age 65) would be hit harder than elderly tax units, 
losing 1 percent (compared with 0.3 percent) of after-tax income. Elderly tax units are more likely to 
                                                     
11 For example, if a taxpayer currently claims a mortgage interest deduction of $8,000 and is in the 15 percent bracket, the 
tax saving is $1,200.  A 20 percent interest credit would be worth more to this taxpayer than the deduction ($1,600), but 
less than a credit equal to the minimum of 100 percent of interest paid or $2,300. 
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have paid off their mortgages and in general have a larger share of their income from non-taxable 
sources (such as the untaxed portion of Social Security benefits) than tax units under age 65. 
The proposal to limit the benefit of the mortgage interest deduction in the top tax brackets to 28 
percent of interest paid affects only 1.6 percent of tax units, but it raises tax liability for 4.6 percent 
of married taxpayers with children. A larger share of non-elderly taxpayers (1.8 percent) see their 
taxes increase than elderly taxpayers (0.9 percent). The average tax increase and average drop in 
after-tax income is also larger for married couples with children than for others and larger for non-
elderly tax units than for elderly ones. 
Replacing the mortgage interest deduction with an interest credit reduces after-tax income (raises 
taxes) for married families with children, who benefit most from the deduction, and raises after-tax 
incomes for other family types, but generally the net gains and losses are modest (table 6a). 
Taxpayers over age 65 lose from substituting a credit for the deduction and taxpayers under age 65 
gain slightly.  Comparing all the options among family types and between over and under 65 
taxpayers (table 7a), married couples and singles with no children benefit the most from the non-
refundable, capped 100 percent credit and benefit the least from the refundable matching credit. 
Singles with children benefit most from the refundable, capped 100 percent credit and least from 
the non-refundable matching credit. Married couples with children are on average net losers under 
all four options, losing the most from replacing the MID with the 100 percent capped credits (both 
refundable and non-refundable) and losing the least from replacing the MID with matching credits. In 
all cases, average changes in after-tax income for all family types are much less than 1 percent. 
Taxpayers over age 65 gain on average from substituting all the mortgage credit options for the MID. 
The capped credits produce larger net gains for them than the matching credits. Taxpayers under 
age 65 experience very modest average net losses (less than 0.1 percent of after-tax income) from 
all the options. 
Estimates with Behavioral Responses 
Estimates with behavioral response show a similar pattern as the static estimates, except that 
eliminating the MID raises less from the highest income taxpayers—the ones most able to respond to 
elimination of the MID by paying down their mortgages—when portfolio behavior is included (table 
2b).  Eliminating the MID still reduces after-tax income more for higher than for lower income 
taxpayers except at the very top of the income distribution. But with behavior included, the reduction 
in after-tax income for the top 1 percent of taxpayers is only 0.2 percent, much less than the 0.8 
percent reduction for the entire population. The absolute average tax increase is also lower for the 
top 1 percent than for the next 4 percent, reflecting the high concentration of financial wealth among 
this group of taxpayers. Limiting the mortgage interest deduction only for taxpayers with marginal tax 
rates above 28 percent still mainly affects taxpayers in the top 5 percent of the income distribution, 
but their estimated tax increase is smaller than in the static simulation. 
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When behavioral responses are included, revenue-neutral mortgage credit options are slightly less 
generous than when no behavior is assumed. Eliminating the MID would finance an uncapped non-
refundable credit of 19.2 percent of interest paid, a 100 percent capped non-refundable credit of 
interest paid up to $1,692, an uncapped refundable credit of 16.3 percent of interest, and a capped 
100 percent refundable credit of interest paid up to $1,258 (table 3b). With the lower credits, low-
income groups do not gain as much from replacing the MID with mortgage interest credits as in the 
static estimates. Still, lower income groups remain net winners from substituting credits, especially 
refundable credits, for the MID and high-income groups are worse off.  Taxpayers in the fourth 
quintile of the income distribution continue to fare better with non-refundable than with refundable 
credits (table 4b). 
The distributions by age and family type are also similar for the static and behavioral estimates. With 
behavior, eliminating the MID continues to reduce after-tax income by a larger percentage for 
married couples with children than for singles and those with no children and by a larger percentage 
for non-elderly than elderly taxpayers (table 5b). Replacing the mortgage interest deduction with 
mortgage credit options continues to lower after-tax incomes of married couples with children and 
raise after-tax incomes of married couples without children and singles (table 6b). It also continues 
to raise the after-tax incomes of taxpayers over age 65 and lower after-tax incomes for those under 
age 65. 
Effects of Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Race and Location 
To explore potentially important disparities in the effects of alternatives to the mortgage interest 
deduction, data from the 2007 American Communities Survey (ACS) were used to impute the 
distribution of impacts across racial and ethnic groups and across several types of geographic 
locations. The TPC model classifies taxpayers based on their income, housing tenure, and mortgage 
status, but the underlying tax return data upon which the TPC model relies do not report taxpayers’ 
race, ethnicity, or residential location. Therefore, for each category of taxpayer in the TPC model, ACS 
data were used to estimate the share of taxpayers in each of four racial/ethnic groups: non-Hispanic 
whites, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and Asians/others.12 Similarly, for each category of taxpayer, 
ACS data were used to estimate the share living in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, and for 
those living in metropolitan areas, the share living in central cities or suburbs and the share living in 
each of the four census regions. Based on these ACS distributions (summarized in appendix tables 
A.1, A.2, and A.3) the TPC model results are stratified by taxpayers’ racial/ethnic identity and 
geographic location. 
                                                     
12 The ACS microdata are reported for households or individuals, not for tax units. For this analysis, tax units were created 
from ACS households using the family unit and subfamily variables. For households consisting of multiple families, we 
assumed that each family was a distinct taxpaying unit. In instances where more than one family was residing in an owner-
occupied home, the head of household was designated the owner of the home. All other tax units in the household were 
then coded as renters. 
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Distributional Estimates by Race and Ethnicity 
Black and Hispanic taxpayers are much less likely than whites or Asians to benefit from the home 
mortgage deduction. On average, blacks and Hispanics have lower incomes, lower rates of 
homeownership, and lower house values than whites. Consequently, they are less likely to qualify for 
the home mortgage deduction, less likely to itemize, and less likely to realize substantial tax savings. 
Asians are only slightly less likely than whites to benefit from the home mortgage deduction. 
Table 8a reports the results of our six tax policy alternatives, stratified by the imputed race or 
ethnicity of the taxpayer. Eliminating the home mortgage deduction altogether would increase taxes 
for 26.4 percent of whites and 22.8 percent of Asians, compared with only 14.0 percent of blacks 
and 14.5 percent of Hispanics. The disparate effect is largely due to differences in homeownership 
rates among these groups, as illustrated by table 9a, which presents the same results, but only for 
homeowners. But even among homeowners, a larger share of whites (44.0 percent) would see a tax 
increase than blacks (37.0 percent) or Hispanics (39.8 percent). Interestingly, after controlling for 
homeownership status, Asians would be even more likely than whites to pay higher taxes if the 
mortgage interest deduction were eliminated, with 52.9 percent seeing a tax increase. 
The same racial and ethnic differences would apply under the second reform alternative—limiting the 
mortgage interest deduction to 28 percent for high-income taxpayers. Although this alternative would 
affect a much smaller share of taxpayers, whites and Asians are over three times more likely than 
blacks and about 2.5 times more likely than Hispanics to pay higher taxes. Again, differences across 
racial and ethnic groups persist even among homeowners. 
Replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a non-refundable tax credit (the third and fourth 
reform alternatives considered here) would raise taxes for some while reducing taxes for others. 
Whites and Asians would be more likely than blacks or Hispanics to see a tax increase, but whites 
would also be the most likely to enjoy a tax cut under these alternatives. Under the third alternative, 
for example, 11.3 percent of whites and 10.9 percent of Asians would pay higher taxes, compared 
with only 5.2 percent of blacks and 5.9 percent of Hispanics. But a much larger share of whites 
(26.0 percent) would see a tax cut, compared with only 16.7 percent of blacks, 15.5 percent of 
Hispanics, and 18.9 percent of Asians. After controlling for homeownership status, racial/ethnic 
differences in the share with a tax cut essentially disappear, although whites and Asians are still 
more likely than blacks or Hispanics to see their taxes increase. Under both of these non-refundable 
tax credit options, the average tax liability among whites would remain essentially unchanged, while 
the average among blacks and Hispanics would fall and the average among Asians would increase. 
A refundable tax credit would yield tax cuts for a larger share of households in every racial and ethnic 
group. Again, whites and Asians would be more likely than blacks or Hispanics to see a tax increase, 
and whites would also be the most likely to enjoy a tax cut. However, when we control for 
homeownership status, these alternatives yield tax cuts for a much larger share of black and 
Hispanic homeowners than for white or Asian homeowners. To illustrate, replacing the MID with a 
refundable capped credit gives 57.6 percent of white homeowners and 56.0 percent of Asian 
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homeowners a tax cut, compared with 69.5 percent of black homeowners and 69.0 percent of 
Hispanic homeowners. Both of the refundable tax credit alternatives would result in a small tax 
increase for the average white taxpayer, a considerably larger increase for the average Asian 
taxpayer, and tax cuts for the average black and Hispanic taxpayer 
All of the differences across racial and ethnic groups persist under the assumption of a behavioral 
response to the tax policy changes. These results are reported in appendix tables 8b and 9b. 
Distributional Estimates across Cities, Suburbs, and Non-metro Areas 
A larger share of the taxpayers who live in suburban metropolitan areas benefit from the home 
mortgage deduction than those living in central cities or non-metropolitan areas. On average, 
suburban taxpayers have higher incomes and are more likely to own their homes. And house values 
in suburban areas are higher (on average) than in either central cities or non-metropolitan 
communities. 
Table 10a reports the results of our six tax policy alternatives, stratified by the type of community in 
which the taxpayer lives. Eliminating the home mortgage deduction altogether would increase taxes 
for 31.1 percent of suburban residents, compared with only 16.1 percent of central city taxpayers 
and 17.4 percent of non-metro taxpayers. The geographic distribution of tax changes is essentially 
the same under the second reform alternative—limiting the mortgage interest deduction to 28 
percent for high-income taxpayers. The share of taxpayers affected by this change is much smaller, 
but the share of suburban residents paying higher taxes is over twice the share of central city 
residents and more than three times the share of non-metro residents. 
If the mortgage interest deduction were replaced with a non-refundable tax credit (alternatives three 
and four) more taxpayers in all three types of communities would see a tax cut than a tax increase. 
Suburban taxpayers are the most likely to be affected one way or the other. For example, under the 
third alternative, 27.7 percent of suburban taxpayers would see a tax cut and 14.2 percent would 
pay higher taxes. Among central city taxpayers, only 15.8 percent would see a tax cut and 7.0 
percent would pay more. And among those living in non-metro areas, 11.2 percent would pay less in 
taxes and 6.2 percent would pay more. Under these non-refundable tax credit options, the average 
tax liability would rise for suburban residents, while remaining essentially unchanged for central city 
taxpayers, and dropping for those living in non-metro communities. 
A refundable tax credit (alternatives five and six) would yield tax cuts for a larger share of taxpayers 
in all types of communities. But under these scenarios, taxpayers living in non-metro areas would be 
most likely to see a tax reduction and their average tax liability would decline substantially. To 
illustrate, under alternative five, 37.2 percent of non-metro taxpayers would pay lower taxes, while 
only 7.1 percent would see taxes increase. On average, the tax liability among these taxpayers would 
drop $206. In contrast, 34.4 percent of suburban taxpayers would see a tax cut, 16.9 percent would 
see an increase, and the average tax liability would rise by $128. Finally, among central city 
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taxpayers, only 20.9 percent would enjoy a tax cut, 8.4 percent would see an increase, and the 
average liability would remain essentially unchanged. 
All of the differences across types of communities persist under the assumption of a behavioral 
response to the tax policy changes. These results are reported in appendix table 10b. 
Distributional Estimates across Metropolitan Areas by Region 
Table 11a reports the results of our six tax policy alternatives for taxpayers living in metropolitan 
areas, stratified by the geographic region of the county. The share of metropolitan taxpayers that 
benefit from the home mortgage deduction does not vary significantly across geographic regions. 
Eliminating the home mortgage deduction altogether would increase taxes for about a quarter of the 
taxpayers living in the metropolitan areas of all four regions of the country. However, average 
incomes and house values are higher in the metro areas of the Northeast and West than in the 
Midwest and South. Consequently, the size of the average tax increase caused by eliminating the 
mortgage deduction would vary from a high of $639 in the Northeast to a low of $604 in the South. 
Similarly, capping the mortgage interest deduction at 28 percent for high-income taxpayers would 
affect roughly the same share of metro-area taxpayers living in all four regions (about 2 percent). 
Again, the biggest average increase in taxes would occur among those living in metro areas of the 
Northeast and the smallest among those living in the Midwest. 
If the mortgage interest deduction were replaced with a non-refundable tax credit (alternatives three 
and four), the share of taxpayers with a tax cut would vary considerably by region, while the share 
with a tax increase would not. To illustrate, under alternative three, about 11 percent of metro-area 
taxpayers in all four regions would pay higher taxes. But the share paying lower taxes would range 
from a low of 21.3 percent in Northeast metros to 27.2 percent in Midwest metros. Correspondingly, 
the average federal tax change under this alternative would range from a tax cut of $26 among 
taxpayers in Midwest metros to a tax increase of $75 among those living in Northeast metros. 
The same geographic pattern would result if the mortgage deduction was replaced by a refundable 
tax credit (alternatives five and six). Roughly the same share of metro-area taxpayers in all four 
regions would see a tax increase, but the share with a tax cut would be considerably higher in the 
Midwest and South than in the Northeast or West. As a consequence, the average metro-area 
taxpayer living in the Midwest would see a small reduction in total tax liability, while the average 
metro-area taxpayer in the Northeast would see a substantial increase. 
All of these regional differences persist under the assumption of a behavioral response to the tax 
policy changes. These results are reported in appendix table 11b. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The mortgage interest deduction is one of oldest and largest tax preferences in the federal income 
tax and the largest single federal subsidy for owner-occupied housing. Yet most scholars find it has 
little effect on homeownership levels. The deduction only benefits taxpayers who itemize deductions 
on their tax returns and provides a larger subsidy per dollar of interest to higher-income taxpayers 
because the value of the deduction rises with the tax rate. Because most of the subsidy goes to 
individuals who would likely own homes without the tax benefit, it has little effect on homeownership. 
More broadly based interest subsidies or credits for first-time home purchases could increase 
homeownership more, at the same or lower fiscal cost. 
This study examines the distributional effects of the current mortgage interest deduction as well as a 
variety of proposals to modify the deduction. We used the Tax Policy Center micro-simulation model 
to estimate the effects of eliminating the deduction and of replacing it with four options estimated to 
produce the same budgetary cost: a 20 percent, non-refundable interest credit; a 17 percent, 
refundable interest credit; a non-refundable, 100 percent credit on the first $2,030 of mortgage 
interest; and a refundable, 100 percent credit on the first $1,490 of mortgage interest. All of these 
incentives would be available to itemizers and non-itemizers. We also simulate the effects of 
retaining the MID, but limiting the value of the deduction to 28 percent of interest paid, as proposed 
by the Obama administration in fiscal-year 2010 and 2011 budgets. 
Eliminating the MID would reduce after-tax income more for high-income taxpayers than for lower 
income taxpayers.  Those in the 80th to 99th percentiles of the income distribution would experience 
the largest proportional decrease in income. The very highest income taxpayers, however, would 
experience a relatively small loss in income because their mortgage costs as a share of income are 
lower than for other groups. In contrast, limiting the MID to 28 percent of interest paid would affect 
only the very highest income taxpayers who are now in the 33 or 35 percent rate brackets. 
Replacing the MID with any of the four options examined would benefit taxpayers in the bottom four 
quintiles of the income distribution and hurt taxpayers in the top quintile. Taxpayers in the bottom 
three quintiles would benefit the most from the 100 percent capped refundable credit, while 
taxpayers in the fourth quintile would gain the most under the 100 percent non-refundable credit 
because they have enough liability to absorb the credit and would gain from the higher subsidy rate. 
High-income taxpayers would lose the most under the capped refundable credit and the least under 
the non-refundable, 20 percent matching subsidy. 
We used data from the American Communities Survey to explore how the distributional effects 
estimated by the TPC model apply across racial and ethnic groups and different types of geographic 
locations. Eliminating the MID would raise taxes for a larger share of whites and Asians than for 
blacks and Hispanics. Limiting the value of the MID to 28 percent of interest would affect many 
fewer taxpayers in all ethnic groups, but would affect a much larger share of whites and Asians 
compared with blacks and Hispanics than totally eliminating the deduction. 
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Replacing the MID with either of the non-refundable credit options would raise average taxes among 
Asians, lower average taxes for blacks and Hispanics, and leave average taxes on whites about the 
same. The refundable credit options would on average raise taxes for both whites and Asians and 
lower taxes for blacks and Hispanics. 
Eliminating the MID would raise taxes more for suburban residents than for those in central cities or 
outside metropolitan areas. Limiting the benefit of the deduction to 28 percent of interest would 
affect far fewer taxpayers than eliminating the MID, but those affected would be even more 
disproportionately concentrated among residents of suburbs. Replacing the MID with the non-
refundable credit options would increase taxes for suburban residents, lower taxes for those outside 
metropolitan areas, and leave average taxes for central city residents about the same. The results 
would be similar for the refundable credit, except that those outside metropolitan areas would 
benefit even more than with a non-refundable credit  
Eliminating the MID would affect approximately the same share of taxpayers in all regions of the 
country. Differences in average tax changes across regions would be modest, with residents of the 
Northeast paying on average the most additional tax and residents of the South the least. Capping 
the mortgage deduction at 28 percent of interest would also affect about the same share of 
taxpayers in all regions, with the average tax changes again largest in the Northeast, but now 
smallest in the Midwest. Replacing the MID with either a refundable or non-refundable credit would 
affect different numbers of metropolitan area taxpayers across regions. The share receiving a net tax 
cut would be highest in Midwest metro areas and lowest in metro areas of the Northeast; on 
average, taxpayers in metro areas in the Northeast would see their taxes rise by $75 while those in 
Midwest metro areas would see their taxes fall by $26. 
In summary, replacing the MID with any of the credit options would benefit low- and middle-income 
groups, blacks and Hispanics, residents outside metropolitan areas, and, among metro residents, 
those living in the Midwest. Redistribution among groups would be larger with refundable than with 
non-refundable credits. The distributional effects largely reflect the fact that the mortgage interest 
deduction provides the largest benefit relative to a credit for taxpayers who itemize, face high 
marginal tax rates, and live in expensive homes. 
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DATA TABLES 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-19
Calendar Year Liability-Static
Eliminate Mortgage Interest Deduction (1)
Current Law 90.0 100.1 107.8 114.3 122.1 129.9 137.6 145.7 153.9 162.8 1,264.2
Current Policy Baseline (2) 76.9 81.6 87.9 93.4 100.0 106.3 112.5 118.8 124.9 131.6 1,033.8
Limit Mortgage Interest Deduction (3)
Current Policy Baseline 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.5 40.
Calendar Year Liability-Behavioral Response (4)
Eliminate Mortgage Interest Deduction
Current Law 78.2 84.9 91.4 96.8 103.3 110.1 116.7 123.6 130.4 137.5 1,072.7
Current Policy Baseline 65.3 69.5 74.8 79.4 85.1 90.5 95.8 101.1 106.2 111.5 879.2
Limit Mortgage Interest Deduction
Current Policy Baseline 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.2 38.
All proposals have an effective date of January 1, 2010.
(4) Estimates include a behavioral response to the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction.  Individuals are expected to sell assets that bear interest, 
dividends and capital gains to pay down their mortgages. 
(3) Proposal limits the tax saving from the mortgage interest deduction to 28 percent of interest paid in the top two rate brackets.
Table 1: Impact on Individual Income Tax Liability and Revenue of Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Calendar Year
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
(2) The current policy baseline extends all of the individual income tax provisions included in 2001 EGTRRA and 2003 JGTRRA; maintains the estate tax at its 
2009 parameters; extends the 2009 AMT Patch and indexes the AMT exemption, tax bracket thresholds, and phaseout thresholds.
(1) Proposal eliminates the home mortgage interest deduction.  Fiscal year estimates assume a 40-60 fiscal split.
4
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All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 23.5 0.6 5.5 21.5 45.2 68.5 74.2 70.4 60.3
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.93% -0.01% -0.12% -0.49% -0.96% -1.59% -1.74% -1.63% -0.41%
Average federal tax change 559 2 32 215 689 1,723 2,643 4,234 5,393
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT 
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 39.5 55.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.15% -0.09%
Average federal tax change 20 0 0 0 0 0 4 385 1150
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Income Percentiles
Table 2a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating or Scaling Back the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Income Group:  Static 
Estimates
ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
 
 
All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.9
Percent with tax increase 22.1 0.6 5.4 21.0 43.4 62.4 66.9 59.4 37.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.79% -0.01% -0.12% -0.48% -0.91% -1.46% -1.51% -1.23% -0.20%
Average federal tax change 476 2 31 209 652 1,588 2,294 3,185 2,576
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT 
Percent with tax cut 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.9 4.1 3.2 1.1 0.4
Percent with tax increase 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.4 39.3 53.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.15% -0.09%
Average federal tax change 19 0 0 -1 -2 -3 -1 382 1,107
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
Income Percentiles
Table 2b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating or Scaling Back the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Income Group with 
Behavioral Response
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REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO
20.0 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 21.4 2.9 16.9 36.2 43.5 24.5 8.4 3.0 2.9
Percent with tax increase 12.0 0.0 0.8 5.3 15.0 44.6 66.3 67.4 57.5
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.04% 0.22% 0.39% 0.36% -0.10% -0.40% -0.61% -0.15%
Average federal tax change -1 -5 -58 -169 -257 106 604 1,583 1,907
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 23.4 2.9 16.9 36.9 45.7 32.6 23.9 12.6 10.4
Percent with tax increase 10.0 0.0 0.9 4.7 13.1 36.5 50.9 57.9 50.1
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.09% 0.55% 0.93% 0.56% -0.33% -0.77% -1.09% -0.32%
Average federal tax change 0 -9 -141 -408 -405 354 1,163 2,840 4,211
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH
REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO
17.1 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 31.1 19.4 33.6 46.4 44.3 18.9 6.5 2.8 2.9
Percent with tax increase 12.1 0.0 0.0 3.5 15.5 50.7 68.5 68.0 57.8
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.59% 0.62% 0.56% 0.25% -0.30% -0.59% -0.75% -0.18%
Average federal tax change 0 -65 -161 -246 -182 324 894 1,957 2,404
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 32.1 21.6 34.3 45.6 40.8 23.9 16.6 9.6 8.5
Percent with tax increase 12.0 0.0 0.3 4.6 19.0 45.7 58.4 61.3 52.1
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 1.49% 1.35% 1.02% 0.23% -0.65% -1.02% -1.23% -0.35%
Average federal tax change 0 -165 -349 -444 -166 702 1,545 3,200 4,512
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 3a: Distributional Effects by Income Group of Replacing the Mortgage Interest Deduction with a Mortgage Interest 
Credit:  Static Estimates
Income Percentiles
Income Percentiles
Income Percentiles
Income Percentiles
 
 Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction  21 
REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO
19.2 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 21.4 2.9 16.9 35.9 43.4 24.3 9.6 4.0 3.4
Percent with tax increase 11.1 0.0 0.8 5.4 14.6 43.2 60.2 57.4 37.4
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.04% 0.22% 0.36% 0.32% -0.13% -0.40% -0.54% -0.09%
Average federal tax change -1 -5 -56 -157 -228 140 608 1,411 1,235
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,692 All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 23.1 2.9 16.9 36.0 42.7 29.9 26.3 22.6 30.1
Percent with tax increase 10.4 0.0 1.0 5.7 16.0 39.3 48.4 47.9 30.3
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.09% 0.51% 0.78% 0.38% -0.41% -0.71% -0.80% -0.13%
Average federal tax change 0 -10 -132 -340 -276 446 1,081 2,082 1,707
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH
REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO
16.3 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 31.0 19.2 33.3 46.1 44.2 19.2 7.9 3.7 3.4
Percent with tax increase 11.2 0.0 0.0 3.6 15.0 48.7 62.2 58.1 37.6
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.56% 0.59% 0.52% 0.21% -0.32% -0.58% -0.66% -0.12%
Average federal tax change 0 -62 -152 -225 -150 350 875 1,724 1,522
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,258 All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Percent with tax cut 32.0 21.6 34.1 44.2 38.4 23.4 21.7 19.9 28.4
Percent with tax increase 12.1 0.0 0.6 6.0 21.4 46.2 53.3 50.9 32.2
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 1.34% 1.17% 0.82% 0.11% -0.67% -0.91% -0.91% -0.15%
Average federal tax change -1 -148 -303 -360 -76 729 1,386 2,360 1,924
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 11,067 25,893 43,678 71,839 108,418 151,680 259,935 1,302,188
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Income Percentiles
Table 3b: Distributional Effects by Income Group of Replacing the Mortgage Interest Deduction with a Mortgage Interest 
Credit with Behavioral Response 
Income Percentiles
Income Percentiles
Income Percentiles
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Table 4a: Distributional Effects by Income Group of Options for Reforming Mortgage Interest Subsidies: Static Options 
SUMMARY: CHANGE IN AFTER-TAX INCOME All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Replace MID with non-refundable 20.0% credit 0.00% 0.04% 0.22% 0.39% 0.36% -0.10% -0.40% -0.61% -0.15%
Replace MID with non-refundable $2,030 credit 0.00% 0.09% 0.55% 0.93% 0.56% -0.33% -0.77% -1.09% -0.32%
Replace MID with refundable 17.1% credit 0.00% 0.59% 0.62% 0.56% 0.25% -0.30% -0.59% -0.75% -0.18%
Replace MID with refundable $1490 credit 0.00% 1.49% 1.35% 1.02% 0.23% -0.65% -1.02% -1.23% -0.35%
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Income Percentiles
 
 
 
SUMMARY: CHANGE IN AFTER-TAX INCOME All Units 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1
Replace MID with non-refundable 19.2% credit 0.00% 0.04% 0.22% 0.36% 0.32% -0.13% -0.40% -0.54% -0.09%
Replace MID with non-refundable $1,692 credit 0.00% 0.09% 0.51% 0.78% 0.38% -0.41% -0.71% -0.80% -0.13%
Replace MID with refundable 16.3% credit 0.00% 0.56% 0.59% 0.52% 0.21% -0.32% -0.58% -0.66% -0.12%
Replace MID with refundable $1258 credit 0.00% 1.34% 1.17% 0.82% 0.11% -0.67% -0.91% -0.91% -0.15%
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 4b: Distributional Effects by Income Group of Options for Reforming Mortgage Interest Subsidies with Behavioral 
Response
Income Percentiles
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Married Married Single Single Non-
ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 23.5 28.7 50.4 13.2 14.3 10.2 26.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.93% -0.73% -1.39% -0.69% -0.69% -0.29% -1.09%
Average federal tax change 559 667 1,464 241 250 183 649
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT 
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 1.6 2.5 4.6 0.4 0.3 0.9 1.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% -0.03% -0.06% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 20 29 62 5 3 9 23
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 5a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating or Scaling Back the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Family Type 
and Age:  Static Estimates 
 
 
Married Married Single Single Non-
ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.4
Percent with tax increase 22.1 25.8 48.4 12.3 14.1 8.0 25.5
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.79% -0.58% -1.20% -0.60% -0.65% -0.18% -0.94%
Average federal tax change 476 533 1,265 209 232 115 562
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT 
Percent with tax cut 1.0 0.5 1.8 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.0
Percent with tax increase 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 2.3 0.9 1.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% -0.01% -0.04% -0.01% -0.03% -0.01% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 19 4 42 3 21 6 22
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 5b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating or Scaling Back the Mortgage Interest Deduction by Family Type 
and Age with Behavioral Responses 
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REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO Married Married Single Single Non-
20.0 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 21.4 29.9 30.6 15.4 15.6 17.3 22.4
Percent with tax increase 12.0 13.6 27.4 6.7 6.2 4.2 13.8
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.06% -0.11% 0.03% 0.09% 0.08% -0.02%
Average federal tax change -1 -56 117 -10 -33 -48 11
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% Married Married Single Single Non-
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 23.4 32.7 31.0 18.1 15.8 18.8 24.5
Percent with tax increase 10.0 11.0 27.1 4.1 6.0 2.8 11.8
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.09% -0.39% 0.29% 0.21% 0.18% -0.05%
Average federal tax change 0 -83 413 -99 -75 -114 27
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH
REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO Married Married Single Single Non-
17.1 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 31.1 41.9 44.7 20.4 31.4 29.2 31.6
Percent with tax increase 12.1 14.9 25.8 7.4 4.7 4.6 13.8
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.03% -0.10% 0.00% 0.29% 0.08% -0.02%
Average federal tax change 0 -25 109 0 -106 -53 13
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% Married Married Single Single Non-
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 32.1 43.7 40.7 23.5 30.7 32.8 32.0
Percent with tax increase 12.0 14.2 29.9 5.7 5.6 3.7 13.9
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.06% -0.42% 0.23% 0.61% 0.26% -0.07%
Average federal tax change 0 -58 444 -82 -221 -163 39
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 6a: Distributional Effects by Family Type and Age of Replacing the Mortgage Interest Deduction with a Mortgage 
Interest Credit:  Static Estimates
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REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO Married Married Single Single Non-
19.2 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 21.4 30.0 30.4 15.4 15.5 17.8 22.3
Percent with tax increase 11.1 11.8 26.4 6.3 6.3 2.8 13.2
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.07% -0.11% 0.02% 0.08% 0.09% -0.02%
Average federal tax change -1 -62 118 -8 -28 -57 13
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% Married Married Single Single Non-
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,692 All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 23.1 32.7 30.4 17.7 15.5 19.3 24.0
Percent with tax increase 10.4 11.0 27.8 4.5 6.4 2.3 12.4
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.09% -0.37% 0.25% 0.14% 0.23% -0.06%
Average federal tax change 0 -104 386 -86 -50 -141 34
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH
REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO Married Married Single Single Non-
16.3 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 31.0 41.8 44.5 20.4 31.3 29.4 31.4
Percent with tax increase 11.2 13.0 24.7 6.9 4.6 3.1 13.1
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.04% -0.10% 0.00% 0.26% 0.10% -0.03%
Average federal tax change 0 -36 110 1 -94 -66 16
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
REPLACE MORTAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% Married Married Single Single Non-
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,258 All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Percent with tax cut 32.0 44.2 40.4 23.3 30.2 33.4 31.6
Percent with tax increase 12.1 13.7 30.1 6.0 6.2 3.1 14.3
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.09% -0.39% 0.20% 0.49% 0.29% -0.07%
Average federal tax change -1 -83 407 -71 -175 -184 42
Average after-tax income (baseline) 60,371 91,140 105,307 34,797 35,958 62,727 59,803
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 6b: Distributional Effects by Family Type and Age of Replacing the Mortgage Interest Deduction with a 
Mortgage Interest Credit with Behavioral Responses
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Table 7a: Distributional Effects by Family Type of Options for Reforming Mortgage Interest Subsidies: Static Options
Married Married Single Single Non-
SUMMARY: CHANGE IN AFTER-TAX INCOME All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Replace MID with non-refundable 20.0% credit 0.00% 0.06% -0.11% 0.03% 0.09% 0.08% -0.02%
Replace MID with non-refundable $2,030 credit 0.00% 0.09% -0.39% 0.29% 0.21% 0.18% -0.05%
Replace MID with refundable 17.1% credit 0.00% 0.03% -0.10% 0.00% 0.29% 0.08% -0.02%
Replace MID with refundable $1490 credit 0.00% 0.06% -0.42% 0.23% 0.61% 0.26% -0.07%
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).  
 
 
Married Married Single Single Non-
SUMMARY: CHANGE IN AFTER-TAX INCOME All Units No Kids with kids No kids with kids Elderly Elderly
Replace MID with non-refundable 19.2% credit 0.00% 0.07% -0.11% 0.02% 0.08% 0.09% -0.02%
Replace MID with non-refundable $1,692 credit 0.00% 0.09% -0.37% 0.25% 0.14% 0.23% -0.06%
Replace MID with refundable 16.3% credit 0.00% 0.04% -0.10% 0.00% 0.26% 0.10% -0.03%
Replace MID with refundable $1,258 credit 0.00% 0.09% -0.39% 0.20% 0.49% 0.29% -0.07%
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4).
Table 7b: Distributional Effects by Family Type of Options for Reforming Mortgage Interest Subsidies with Behavioral 
Response 
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Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic Asian/Other
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 26.4 14.0 14.5 22.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.96% -0.72% -0.73% -0.90%
Average federal tax change 632 277 302 613
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 1.9 0.6 0.7 2.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.04% -0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 23 7 9 25
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 26.0 16.7 15.5 18.9
Percent with tax increase 11.3 5.2 5.9 10.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.01% 0.17% 0.09% -0.14%
Average federal tax change 6 -67 -37 95
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 23.7 15.6 14.6 16.7
Percent with tax increase 13.5 6.3 6.7 13.1
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.07% 0.05% -0.07%
Average federal tax change 2 -28 -20 46
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 34.2 25.6 25.8 24.5
Percent with tax increase 13.6 6.2 6.7 12.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% 0.28% 0.26% -0.18%
Average federal tax change 21 -107 -105 122
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 33.7 25.1 25.8 23.8
Percent with tax increase 13.8 6.3 6.3 13.4
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% 0.13% 0.15% -0.10%
Average federal tax change 10 -48 -62 65
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model 
Table 8a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction 
by Taxpayer Race and Ethnicity
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 17.1 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 20.0 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
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Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic Asian/Other
Percent with tax cut 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
Percent with tax increase 24.7 13.4 13.8 21.4
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.81% -0.63% -0.64% -0.76%
Average federal tax change 537 242 265 519
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.9
Percent with tax increase 2.1 0.7 0.8 2.2
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03%
Average federal tax change 22 7 8 23
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 25.6 16.4 15.1 18.7
Percent with tax increase 11.7 5.6 6.2 11.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.01% 0.14% 0.06% -0.12%
Average federal tax change 4 -54 -26 81
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 23.7 15.6 14.5 16.7
Percent with tax increase 12.5 6.0 6.4 12.2
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.06% 0.04% -0.06%
Average federal tax change 2 -25 -17 44
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 34.1 25.3 25.5 24.6
Percent with tax increase 13.7 6.5 7.0 12.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% 0.23% 0.21% -0.15%
Average federal tax change 15 -89 -85 101
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Percent with tax cut 33.6 25.1 25.7 23.8
Percent with tax increase 12.8 5.9 6.0 12.4
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.01% 0.11% 0.14% -0.09%
Average federal tax change 9 -44 -56 61
Average after-tax income (baseline) 66,113 38,661 41,129 68,121
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model 
Table 8b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction by 
Taxpayer Race and Ethnicity, with Behavior Responses
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 16.3 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,692
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 19.2 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
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Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic Asian/Other
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 44.0 37.0 39.8 52.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -1.28% -1.32% -1.35% -1.48%
Average federal tax change 1054 727 837 1428
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 3.2 1.6 2.0 4.6
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.05% -0.03% -0.04% -0.06%
Average federal tax change 39 19 25 57
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 43.4 44.4 41.8 43.3
Percent with tax increase 18.8 13.7 16.3 25.4
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.01% 0.33% 0.15% -0.24%
Average federal tax change 9 -181 -93 229
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 39.7 41.4 39.2 38.2
Percent with tax increase 22.4 16.6 18.7 30.4
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.13% 0.08% -0.11%
Average federal tax change 3 -74 -52 111
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 57.6 69.5 69.0 56.0
Percent with tax increase 22.5 16.3 18.4 30.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.04% 0.53% 0.43% -0.31%
Average federal tax change 34 -293 -270 296
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 57.4 69.5 70.0 55.1
Percent with tax increase 22.8 16.3 17.5 31.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% 0.24% 0.26% -0.16%
Average federal tax change 17 -131 -163 157
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model 
Table 9a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction by Taxpayer Race and Ethnicity, Homeowners Only
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 17.1 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
FOR HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
100% NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 
20.0 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
100% REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
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Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic Asian/Other
Percent with tax cut 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.3
Percent with tax increase 41.2 35.0 38.0 49.5
Percentage change in after-tax income -1.08% -1.15% -1.18% -1.25%
Average federal tax change 895 636 733 1207
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 3.2 2.6 2.8 3.7
Percent with tax increase 3.5 1.9 2.3 5.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.04% -0.03% -0.04% -0.06%
Average federal tax change 36 17 23 54
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 42.8 43.5 40.8 42.8
Percent with tax increase 19.5 14.7 17.4 25.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.01% 0.27% 0.10% -0.20%
Average federal tax change 6 -147 -64 195
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 39.7 41.4 39.2 38.3
Percent with tax increase 20.9 15.7 17.9 28.4
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.00% 0.12% 0.07% -0.11%
Average federal tax change 3 -66 -45 105
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 57.4 68.7 68.2 56.3
Percent with tax increase 22.7 17.1 19.2 29.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% 0.44% 0.35% -0.25%
Average federal tax change 24 -243 -216 246
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Percent with tax cut 57.5 69.6 69.9 55.3
Percent with tax increase 21.0 15.2 16.5 28.7
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% 0.22% 0.24% -0.15%
Average federal tax change 15 -119 -148 146
Average after-tax income (baseline) 82,578 55,240 62,105 96,522
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model 
Table 9b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction by Taxpayer Race and Ethnicity, Homeowners Only, with Behavior Responses
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION 
WITH 100% REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP 
TO $1,490 
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION WITH REFUNDABLE 
CREDIT EQUAL TO 16.3 PERCENT OF 
INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE 
DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION FOR HIGH-INCOME 
TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION 
WITH 100% NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT 
UP TO $1,692
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION WITH NON-REFUNDABLE 
CREDIT EQUAL TO 19.2 PERCENT OF 
INTEREST PAID
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Non-
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas-Central 
City
Metropolitan 
Areas-
Suburban 
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 17.4 25.0 16.1 31.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.71% -0.96% -0.71% -1.08%
Average federal tax change 324 617 391 798
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 0.7 1.9 1.2 2.5
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% -0.04% -0.03% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 9 23 14 31
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 22.2 23.7 15.8 27.7
Percent with tax increase 6.2 11.0 7.0 14.2
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.24% -0.04% -0.02% -0.10%
Average federal tax change -111 29 10 76
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 21.4 21.3 13.9 24.9
Percent with tax increase 6.8 13.3 8.8 16.9
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.14% -0.02% -0.03% -0.05%
Average federal tax change -62 16 14 36
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 37.2 30.6 20.9 34.4
Percent with tax increase 7.1 13.2 8.4 16.9
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.45% -0.08% -0.04% -0.17%
Average federal tax change -206 54 21 128
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 37.9 30.3 20.3 34.0
Percent with tax increase 6.3 13.5 9.0 17.3
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.26% -0.05% -0.04% -0.09%
Average federal tax change -117 31 22 67
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Table 10a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction, by 
Taxpayer Metropolitan Area Status
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model 
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 17.1 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 20.0 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
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Non-
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas-Central 
City
Metropolitan 
Areas-
Suburban 
Percent with tax cut 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8
Percent with tax increase 16.5 23.4 15.0 29.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.62% -0.81% -0.60% -0.91%
Average federal tax change 283 523 330 676
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 1.3 1.8 1.1 2.2
Percent with tax increase 0.9 2.1 1.3 2.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.02% -0.03% -0.02% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 8 22 13 29
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 21.8 23.3 15.6 27.3
Percent with tax increase 6.6 11.4 7.2 14.6
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.20% -0.04% -0.01% -0.09%
Average federal tax change -93 24 5 65
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 21.4 21.4 13.9 24.9
Percent with tax increase 6.4 11.4 8.2 15.8
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.13% -0.02% -0.02% -0.05%
Average federal tax change -58 15 13 35
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 55.7 30.5 20.9 34.4
Percent with tax increase 7.5 13.2 8.4 16.9
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.38% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14%
Average federal tax change -174 44 14 106
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Percent with tax cut 37.9 30.4 20.3 434.1
Percent with tax increase 5.9 12.5 8.3 16.0
Percentage change in after-tax income 0.24% -0.04% -0.04% -0.08%
Average federal tax change -109 29 20 63
Average after-tax income (baseline) 45,676 64,598 55,215 74,135
Table 10b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, by Taxpayer Metropolitan Area Status, with Behavior Responses
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model 
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
100% REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT 
EQUAL TO 16.3 PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
FOR HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 
PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 
100% NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO 
$1,692
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION WITH NON-REFUNDABLE 
CREDIT EQUAL TO 19.2 PERCENT OF 
INTEREST PAID
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Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Northeast 
Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Midwest 
Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the  
West Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
South Region
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 24.4 26.7 24.5 25.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.91% -1.03% -0.93% -0.97%
Average federal tax change 639 612 619 604
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percent with tax increase 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 25 21 24 22
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 21.3 27.2 22.3 24.4
Percent with tax increase 11.3 11.1 11.0 10.8
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.11% 0.04% -0.07% -0.02%
Average federal tax change 75 -26 49 12
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 19.0 25.3 19.7 22.1
Percent with tax increase 13.6 12.9 13.5 13.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.05% 0.03% -0.04% -0.01%
Average federal tax change 37 -16 29 8
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 26.1 36.1 28.0 32.6
Percent with tax increase 13.5 13.2 13.2 12.9
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.17% 0.03% -0.13% -0.04%
Average federal tax change 120 -18 87 24
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 27.1 36.3 27.3 32.3
Percent with tax increase 13.9 12.9 13.9 13.2
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.09% 0.03% -0.08% -0.03%
Average federal tax change 65 -15 53 16
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model 
Table 11a: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction by 
Taxpayer Metropolitan Status and Geographic Region
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 17.1 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $2,030 
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 20.0 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
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Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Northeast 
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Midwest 
Metropolitan 
Areas in the  
West Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
South Region
Percent with tax cut 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Percent with tax increase 22.9 25.2 22.8 23.5
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.77% -0.88% -0.79% -0.82%
Average federal tax change 541 526 521 513
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8
Percent with tax increase 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
Average federal tax change 24 20 22 21
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 21.0 26.7 22.0 24.1
Percent with tax increase 11.6 11.6 11.3 11.2
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.09% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02%
Average federal tax change 64 -18 39 10
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 19.0 25.2 19.8 22.2
Percent with tax increase 12.6 12.1 12.5 12.1
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.05% 0.02% -0.04% -0.01%
Average federal tax change 36 -14 27 8
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 26.2 35.8 28.0 32.6
Percent with tax increase 13.5 13.5 13.2 13.0
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.14% 0.02% -0.10% -0.03%
Average federal tax change 100 -12 69 18
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Percent with tax cut 26 36 27 32
Percent with tax increase 13 12 13 12
Percentage change in after-tax income -0.09% 0.02% -0.07% -0.02%
Average federal tax change 61 -13 48 15
Average after-tax income (baseline) 70,100 59,476 66,308 62,482
Table 11b: Distributional Effects of Eliminating, Scaling Back, or Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction by 
Taxpayer Metropolitan Status and Geographic Region, with Behavior Response
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model 
5. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,490 
6. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 16.3 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
1. ELIMINATE HOME MORTGAGE DEDUCTION
2. LIMIT MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS TO 28 PERCENT
3. REPLACE MORTGAGE DEDUCTION WITH 100% 
NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT UP TO $1,692
4. REPLACE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
WITH NON-REFUNDABLE CREDIT EQUAL TO 19.2 
PERCENT OF INTEREST PAID
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APPENDIX A1 – A3 
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Table A.1:  Racial Distribution Across Income Decile and Tenure
Income 
Decile:
Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic
Asian-
Other
Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hispanic
Asian-
Other
Non-Hispanic 
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black Hisp
0-10% 70% 13% 12% 6% 78% 10% 7% 5% 59% 16% 19%
10-20% 72% 11% 12% 5% 84% 7% 6% 3% 57% 20% 16%
20-30% 74% 10% 11% 4% 86% 6% 5% 3% 61% 16% 17%
30-40% 76% 9% 10% 4% 87% 5% 5% 3% 64% 14% 15%
40-50% 78% 8% 9% 4% 87% 5% 5% 3% 65% 13% 14%
50-60% 80% 7% 8% 4% 88% 5% 5% 3% 65% 12% 14%
60-70% 81% 7% 8% 5% 87% 4% 5% 4% 66% 11% 12%
70-80% 82% 6% 7% 5% 87% 4% 4% 5% 68% 10% 11%
80-90% 82% 6% 6% 6% 88% 3% 3% 5% 69% 8% 10%
Over 90% 84% 4% 4% 8% 90% 2% 2% 6% 76% 5% 6%
Homeowners with an Active Mortgage Homeowners without an Active Motgage Renters
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Mode  
 
 
 
 Table A.2:  Metropolitan Area Regional Distributions Across Income Decile and Tenure
Income 
Decile:
All 
Metrpolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Northeast 
Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Midwest Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the  
West Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
South Region
0-10% 68% 10% 14% 27% 18%
10-20% 66% 10% 13% 26% 16%
20-30% 68% 10% 15% 27% 16%
30-40% 69% 11% 15% 27% 16%
40-50% 71% 12% 16% 26% 17%
50-60% 72% 12% 16% 26% 17%
60-70% 74% 13% 16% 26% 19%
70-80% 77% 15% 16% 27% 20%
80-90% 82% 17% 16% 28% 22%
Over 90% 89% 20% 14% 29% 25%
Income 
Decile:
All 
Metrpolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Northeast 
Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Midwest Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the  
West Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
South Region
53% 9% 10% 24% 10%
57% 12% 12% 22% 11%
58% 12% 13% 22% 11%
60% 13% 13% 23% 12%
62% 13% 13% 23% 12%
63% 14% 13% 23% 13%
65% 15% 13% 24% 13%
67% 16% 13% 24% 14%
72% 18% 13% 26% 15%
79% 20% 13% 28% 17%
All 
Metrpolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Northeast 
Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
Midwest Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the  
West Region
Metropolitan 
Areas in the 
South Region
74% 15% 14% 25% 19%
75% 15% 14% 26% 21%
78% 15% 13% 27% 22%
81% 16% 13% 28% 24%
82% 18% 12% 26% 26%
83% 19% 12% 26% 27%
85% 20% 10% 26% 29%
87% 21% 9% 24% 32%
89% 23% 8% 25% 34%
91% 28% 7% 23% 32%
ents will not add to 100% the denominator includes data for unincorporated areas 
 geography is unknown
Renters
ban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data 
by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model
0-10%
10-20%
20-30%
30-40%
40-50%
50-60%
60-70%
70-80%
80-90%
Over 90%
Income 
Decile:
0-10%
10-20%
20-30%
30-40%
40-50%
50-60%
60-70%
70-80%
80-90%
Over 90%
Note:  Perc
and where
Source: Ur
generated 
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Table A.3:  Metropolitan Area Status Distributions Across Income Decile and Tenure
Income 
Decile:
Non-
Metropolita
n Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas-Central 
City
Metropolitan 
Areas-
Suburban 
Non-
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas-Central 
City
Metropolitan 
Areas-Suburban 
Non-
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas
Metropolitan 
Areas-Central 
City
Metropolitan 
Areas-
Suburban 
0-10% 23% 68% 12% 26% 35% 53% 9% 19% 19% 74% 24% 18%
10-20% 25% 66% 11% 25% 33% 57% 8% 22% 18% 75% 22% 22%
20-30% 24% 68% 11% 26% 31% 58% 8% 23% 15% 78% 22% 24%
30-40% 22% 69% 11% 28% 30% 60% 8% 25% 13% 81% 22% 27%
40-50% 21% 71% 11% 30% 28% 62% 8% 26% 13% 82% 22% 29%
50-60% 20% 72% 10% 32% 27% 63% 9% 27% 12% 83% 23% 30%
60-70% 18% 74% 10% 34% 25% 65% 9% 28% 10% 85% 24% 31%
70-80% 15% 77% 9% 37% 19% 67% 9% 31% 9% 87% 24% 34%
80-90% 11% 82% 10% 42% 23% 72% 10% 34% 7% 89% 26% 36%
Over 90% 7% 89% 47% 12% 14% 79% 11% 38% 6% 91% 31% 33%
Renters
Source: Urban Institute estimates using 2007 ACS Public Use Microdata applied to data generated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model
Note:  Percents will not add to 100% the denominator includes data for unincorporated areas and where geography is unknown
Homeowners with an Active Mortgage Homeowners without an Active Motgage
 
